The sabotage shows an inadequate warning system

”Warning systems” here refer to routines and technology that allow for effective detection of disturbances and information sharing between societal actors. VMA is an example of a warning system that is directed from authorities to the public. Lex Maria can be said to be an example of the opposite, warnings from citizens to authorities.

Equally important is monitoring and information about disruptions within and between societal actors. The current sabotage against radio masts is unfortunately a clear rejection of today's warning systems for critical infrastructure. They simply do not exist, even though various societal actors are taking a variety of individual protective measures in the area, with the exception of individual sectors, such as aviation.

The Häglareds mast outside Borås was the first to make headlines. The mast fell, disrupting radio and television broadcasts for 80,000 local residents. The police are convinced it is sabotage. The authorities appear to be caught off guard. The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is calling an emergency meeting. Experts in the media are speculating whether this is a stress test from a foreign power (Russia), although the police are keeping the question of motives and actors open.

A few days later, reports of sabotage against another mast outside Tranemo were received. A couple of weeks before the Häglared mast collapsed, the rescue service in Södra Älvsborg had discovered that a cable for their own communications had been cut. A natural question is why that incident did not prompt increased monitoring of other masts. In the Häglared mast case, an existing alarm was not triggered either. Although investigations are ongoing, it is obvious that the safety work is lacking.

On Wikipedia there is a page called ”List of catastrophic collapses of broadcast masts and towers”. References are mainly taken from Antenna Structure Registration, Federal Communications Commission. The list includes 133 collapses since the 20th century. Eight are classified as sabotage or terrorism. So collapses and sabotage of radio masts are nothing new under the sun. They have occurred from time to time.

Radio and TV masts are of course important components of Sweden's crisis communication, but there is little risk and vulnerability analysis from public actors that highlights the vulnerabilities. Awareness is higher regarding sabotage against power lines and networks. This is noticeable in news reporting. Awareness of IT security and cybersecurity is even greater due to the sharp increase in online crime.

Although awareness is high in some areas, question marks must be raised about the current warning system linked to critical infrastructure. There is no obvious and effective information sharing between actors at local and national levels of society regarding disruptions, deviations and incidents. Reporting is reactive and occurs if regulations prescribe it, but ongoing monitoring and information sharing are lacking.

The Swedish National Security Agency (MSB) has decided on an action plan to improve the security of critical infrastructure. Actors responsible for activities of national importance must have introduced so-called systematic security work by 2020. This is a laudable ambition, but short-term given the challenge of developing effective risk and crisis management while at the same time adapting the work to security policy changes, total defense.

Given the development of events, a holistic approach to security work, surveillance and communication, within and between actors responsible for critical activities is needed. Responsibility for this must be built from the bottom up, not the top down. It starts with honest and objective situational pictures of security work in practice.

Tom Andersson, Ph.D., risk management consultant, Basalt AB